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Abstract 
Refugee situations can pose a threat to dignity due to the loss of land and livelihood. This chapter 
however argues that dignity is dynamic, and that autonomy and normalcy can play a role in restoring 
dignity at different stages of the refugee experience. We begin by exploring two theoretical dignity 
dichotomies, and then examine autonomy and normalcy as two of dignity’s overlooked antecedents. We 
proceed to the case of Nepali-Bhutanese refugees, and show how dignity, rather than remaining in a 
steady state, waxes and wanes over time. Before concluding we offer some thoughts as to how dignity can 
be restored in the post-resettlement context. 
2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
‘I lost my self-respect and dignity. I lost all of my belongings. I lost the country of my birth.’ 
     Nepali-Bhutanese refugee, Ambika Prasad Sharma1 
 
Protracted refugee situations – defined by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) as ‘a situation in which 25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality have been in 
exile for five years or longer in a given asylum country’ (UNHCR, 2014: 11) – can pose a serious threat 
to the dignity of refugees living in a state of limbo for a long period of time. And when return to the 
country of origin is not possible, and integration into the country where refugees have initially sought 
protection is not welcome, there are instances where countries of the Global North accept refugees into 
their own countries for permanent resettlement.  
 
One might assume that resettlement offers a way to restore dignity to refugees who have been living in 
protracted refugee situations. But dignity may be elusive in the post-resettlement context. In the following 
chapter, we focus on those refugees who remain after others have resettled. Drawing on research about 
Nepali-Bhutanese refugees living in Nepal, we demonstrate that at different stages of the refugee 
experience, dignity has the potential to be threatened or restored, and that autonomy and normalcy can 
play a role in restoring dignity in protracted refugee situations. We begin by exploring two theoretical 
dignity dichotomies, and after establishing our own understanding of dignity, examine autonomy and 
normalcy as two of dignity’s overlooked antecedents. We proceed to the case of Nepali-Bhutanese 
refugees in Nepal, and show how dignity, rather than remaining in a steady state, waxes and wanes over 
time. Before concluding we offer some thoughts as to how dignity can be restored in the post-resettlement 
context. 
 
DIGNITY DICHOTOMIES 
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Dignity is both an ambitious and an ambiguous concept. We posit that this ambiguity stems from two 
related dichotomies: dignity as restricted or universal and dignity as externally or internally sourced. 
From the Merriam Webster dictionary we know that dignity is defined as the ‘quality or state of being 
worthy, honored, or esteemed.’ But what qualities make someone worthy, and who decides?  
 
What makes someone worthy? Restricted vs universal 
In the Roman era, dignity was accorded to those with elevated social status, suggesting that a person’s 
worth was determined by their merit and contributions to society, and was thus dependent on skills and 
abilities (Waldron, 2007: 221, citing Vlastos 1984). Since then, the concept has undergone a ‘sea change’ 
(Waldron, 2007: 221) and in contrast, today relies on a Kantian view of human beings as ends in 
themselves rather than a means to an end (McCrudden, 2008: 659) and connotes the ‘superiority of 
intrinsic worth of every human being that is independent of external conditions of office, rank, etc. and 
that pertains to everyone’ (Iglesias, 2001: 120).2 This suggests an important dynamism: a person’s dignity 
can change over time because as one’s contributions to society change, so might one’s dignity. This 
dynamism is a point to which we will return. 
  
The contemporary assumption of dignity as a universal marker explains its primacy in human rights 
discourse and human rights law (Donnelly, 1984; Moyn, 2010; Neier, 2013). The three cornerstones of 
international human rights law – the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights – all include the words 
‘inherent dignity.’ The use of dignity in these contexts, used broadly and without an accompanying 
definition, was a strategic choice, an attempt to appeal to a wide swath of global polities and peoples 
(McCrudden, 2013; Schroeder, 2012). Yet while dignity’s inclusion in these and many other foundational 
legal documents can be seen to highlight the relationship between dignity and human rights, it has been 
cogently argued that the concepts should be separated so that the former does not detract from the latter 
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(Schroeder, 2012). That is, the justification for the universality of human rights should not rely on dignity, 
nor its particularly deistic associations.   
 
…And who decides? Externally or internally driven 
In the Roman era, dignity was determined externally. That is, individuals did not confer dignity upon 
themselves, but instead had it conferred on them either by their contributions to society (evaluated by 
others) or by social status (determined by society’s members). In contrast, universal understandings of 
dignity eschew outside evaluation. For this reason, there is often a link made between the universality of 
dignity and its intrinsic nature.  
 
Yet there is still a question about whether the source of dignity comes from an outside source – such as 
society, an individual arbiter, or controversially, we note, human rights law itself, externally imposing 
dignity on everyone – or if dignity comes from within, in which case the variety of human experience 
dictates that there is no one rubric to guide what constitutes human dignity. Instead, a ‘subjective 
experience’ of dignity ‘is something to be realized through the individual human experience of 
autonomous choice in the domain of the political; of happiness, well-being, self-esteem, and 
psychological integrity in the domain of the psychological; of belonging to a group or culture, adhering to 
a set of norms, with access to approval, respect, and recognition in the domain of the social; and of access 
to security, food, shelter, and physical integrity in the domain of the material’ (Mattson and Clark, 2011: 
309). 
 
DYNAMIC DIGNITY 
How do we reconcile the two dichotomies discussed above? Restricted or universal? Driven internally or 
externally? Our position on dignity is that it is dynamic: it can be diminished and it can be restored. Any 
empirical examination of our current world will reveal that ‘many people in the world today continue to 
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live with indignity by anyone’s standards – with hunger, fear, violence or limited health care and 
education’ (Mattson and Clark, 2011: 306). Inequality, prodded by globalization and trade liberalization 
to new heights, has highlighted these indignities. So while the potential for dignity is universal, it is not 
ubiquitous (Donnelly, 1982). Dignity is not present in every person and it is not present all of the time. 
But because each person has the potential for dignity, it can be restored. 
 
Further we assert that dignity is driven by a combination of external and internal sources. Peoples’ sense 
of self as worthy can keep dignity alive when the external environment would suggest otherwise, but we 
also posit that the external environment shapes our inner subjective experience. Again, it may be that the 
contemporary global environment magnifies this phenomenon, because it is easier to know what we lack 
in our globalized world compared to others. Thus a person living in a slum with no running water may 
find it doubly challenging to maintain dignity when globalized technologies present that person with 
images of those living completely different lives. 
 
In the refugee context, which we examine below, this is particularly the case. People whose identity 
markers are stripped from them do have their dignity diminished, and it would be disingenuous to suggest 
otherwise. But this does not suggest that every refugee lacks dignity. 
 
REFUGEES AND DIGNITY 
Refugees – who have been compelled to leave their homes with no knowledge of when they might return 
– fall easily into the category of those for whom the loss of dignity is a threat. The frequent accompanying 
losses of livelihood, community, family, and resources that refugees experience all point to a potential 
loss of dignity. And two further elements are worth noting because they link frequent commonalities of 
refugeehood with dignity: autonomy and normalcy. 
 
6 
 
Autonomy and dignity 
The ability to control one’s individual situation is not among the top conditions that have been noted to 
facilitate dignity. Yet scholars and policymakers alike have noted that a lack of personal control often 
leads to diminishing of dignity. For the elderly (Nordenfelt, 2003) [also, if relevant, add citation from 
chapter in this book], the disabled (Vernon and Qureshi, 2000) and the terminally ill (Chochinov, Hack, 
McClement, Kristjanson, and Harlos, 2002), situations of disempowerment – where individuals are not 
able to make their own choices – create threats to dignity.3  
 
In the case of the refugee experience, a lack of autonomy is very much inherent in the daily lives of 
refugees, where the simple act of securing food for the family (Harrell-Bond, 1986) or moving from place 
to place (Banki, 2015) often requires careful planning or permission from authorities.  There have been 
widespread critiques of the agencies that offer assistance to refugees and the control that they wrest from 
the populations they serve, particularly in refugee camps (Kibreab, 1993; Malkki, 1995). 
 
One aspect of autonomy that is greatly challenged in the refugee context is self-reliance, which the 
UNHCR’s Handbook for Self-Reliance defines as ‘the social and economic ability of an individual, a 
household or a community to meet essential needs (including food, water, shelter, personal safety, health 
and education) in a sustainable manner and with dignity’ (UNHCR, 2005: 1). This is one of several 
international legal documents and guidelines that note the importance of self-reliance to the achievement 
of dignity (Hunter, 2009: 11). 
 
There is an extensive sub-literature of refugee studies that notes the importance of trying to secure 
refugees’ autonomy through self-reliance, some of which mentions dignity specifically (Abdi, 2005; 
Hunter, 2009) and some of which simply notes that empowering refugees to help themselves is better for 
the individual and the community (Muggah, 2000; O'Kane, 2007). While refugee camps are frequently 
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cited as sites where the challenge of being self-reliant is particularly acute, Meredith Hunter demonstrates 
that dignity is threatened by a lack of self-reliance in both Kenyan camps and Ugandan refugee 
settlements. In the former, self-reliance is limited by refugees’ inability to pursue any economic activity; 
in the latter, Hunter points to several factors that limit self-reliance for refugees: host country policies that 
limit refugee movement; UNHCR policies that facilitate the distribution of inappropriate farming land; 
and an absence of enforceable governance and tax structures among refugee leadership organizations 
(2009). In both Kenya and Uganda, Hunter concludes, even self-reliance strategies adopted by 
humanitarian aid organizations have failed to rectify a situation in which refugees are ‘stripped of their 
rights and dignity’ (2009: 2). 
 
Normalcy and Dignity 
Where autonomy is not possible, it has been noted that a sense of normalcy has the potential to restore 
dignity. The literature has been particularly strong in noting this phenomenon among elderly populations, 
where autonomy is often more difficult (Chochinov et al., 2002) [also cite any other chapters in this book 
that discuss normalcy]. Similarly, among traumatized populations, routine and consistency has been seen 
as a way to restore dignity and hope (Wheaton, Alumai, and Onyango, 2008). But one could argue that if 
deprivation is the normal state, anything which challenges that normalcy may improve the chances for 
dignity.4  
 
Two articles of note examine the link between normalcy and dignity specifically in the refugee context, 
and come to diverging conclusions. Awa Abdi examines the limbo of protracted encampment for Somali 
refugees in Kenya and notes that the inability of refugees to fulfill their human capacity has the potential 
to deprive them of their dignity. Further, Abdi elaborates on the sharp transition between the emergency 
period when camps are first established to the care and maintenance phase, where the normalcy of rations 
and distribution in fact take more of a toll on dignity because refugees expect that they will be able to 
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engage in alternative livelihood strategies (2005: 7-8). The continuing dependency on outside assistance 
to the exclusion of their own independence, Abdi notes, diminishes their internal sense of self (2005: 9). 
One of Abdi’s Somali interview subjects declares that a refugee is ‘a person who is sitting somewhere as 
if he/she was handicapped! There are no men who are employed in this block, who go to work in the 
morning and who gain a living. They are sitting around the house. They are unemployed. Nowhere to find 
jobs!’ (Interview quoted of Aliya S., in Abdi, 2005: 9).     
 
In contrast, Rahul Chandrashekhar Oka, writing about the same population of refugees in Kenya, finds 
that refugees’ choice to engage in small-time consumption of non-essential items such as electronics and 
cosmetics – what Oka terms ‘agentive consumption’ (2014: 33) – lends normalcy to their lives and has 
the potential to restore dignity, at least momentarily. During his field research, a large scale rejection of 
resettlement applications by outside agencies led to significantly decreased morale in the camp, but at the 
same time refugees increased their participation in the commercial economy and purchased items for 
celebrations. When pressed as to why, refugees responded that ‘When family and friends gather and we 
feast, we could think we were back in Somalia, when things were caadi, normal’ (Interview quoted in 
Oka, 2014: 32). Oka notes that ‘dignity was a direct outcome of the regular occurrence of feasting and 
other acts of food sharing and the building and maintaining of social ties through gift exchange and 
communal consumption sharing. Normalcy and dignity as desired outcomes of consumption tied people 
to memories of better days and to visions and hopes of brighter futures largely derived through 
momentary escape from the static refugee present’ (2014: 32-33). 
 
Abdi and Oka show us that normalcy can cut both ways when it comes to dignity, establishing routines 
that restore a sense of self, or magnifying difficult situations by offering little hope for change. In the 
refugee context, both of these scenarios are possible. But in the following section, we argue that the 
inability of refugees to go about their daily lives is the greater threat to dignity. And as the case of Nepali-
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Bhutanese refugees living in Nepal suggests, both normalcy and a restoration of self-reliance can 
attenuate the difficulty of protracted refugee living. 
 
LEAVING IN DROVES FROM THE ORANGE GROVES:  
NEPALI-BHUTANESE REFUGEES LIVING IN NEPAL 
While the situation of Nepali-Bhutanese refugees has been one of the most salient examples of a 
protracted refugee situation globally until recently, it has received scant attention by scholars and 
practitioners as compared to other refugee situations. Beginning in the late 1980s, the small Himalayan 
kingdom of Bhutan, perhaps most famously known for ‘Gross National Happiness,’ began enforcing 
policies rendering ethnic minorities distinctly unhappy: ethnically Nepalese citizens of the southern part 
of Bhutan were held to strict language and dress codes that had heretofore gone unenforced (Banki, 
2014). The resistance to these policies brought a more stringent response from the Bhutanese military, 
and as catalogued most comprehensively by Michael Hutt, led to an unprecedented situation in which 
Bhutan expelled up to one-sixth of its citizens, most of whom were from the ethnic Nepalese minority, 
also called the Lhotshampa (Hutt, 2003).5  
 
From the early 1990s until 2008, nearly this entire population of refugees remained in camps in Nepal, 
where they were dependent on assistance from humanitarian agencies and restricted in their movements 
and livelihood pursuits (Banki, 2008b: 32). Multiple pressures from different stakeholders led the 
international community to agree to initiate a program of mass resettlement of Nepali-Bhutanese refugees 
(Banki, 2008b). From mid-2006 onward, tens of thousands of refugees who had been living in camps in 
Nepal since the early 1990s have resettled to countries of the Global North, including the United States, 
Canada, Australia, and several countries in Europe. As of September 2014, 92,000 Nepali-Bhutanese had 
resettled and about 24,000 remained in the camps.6 As of this writing, not one Nepali-Bhutanese has been 
able to return to Bhutan. 
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As noted, there is often an assumption made that resettlement provides a panacea to refugee populations, 
but it is important to note that in all situations of mass resettlement, there are some refugees who remain: 
either they do not qualify for resettlement or they do not want to resettle. Or it may be that they have not 
yet resettled, and because mass resettlement takes several years, they can remain in the camps a long time.  
 
In July 2013, with 36,000 Nepali-Bhutanese refugees still remaining in Nepal, the authors set out to 
determine how mass resettlement was affecting those who remained. Nineteen participants shared their 
experiences in both written and pictoral form using a reciprocal research methodology developed by 
Hugman, Bartolomei and Pittaway (2011). All interviewees were guaranteed confidentiality and 
anonymity, so their responses below are recorded only as part of the group responses. This case study 
draws on data from those 19 participants as well as other primary sources reflecting on the refugee 
experience. We identify three distinct stages that demonstrate that dignity is indeed dynamic, and has the 
potential to ebb and flow over the duration of the refugee experience: flight from Bhutan, camp life over 
the intermediate term, and the post-resettlement phase. While the data are specific to this refugee 
population, similar patterns have been noted in other situations of mass resettlement (Banki and Lang, 
2008b; Robinson, 1998). 
 
Flight from Bhutan: Loss of livelihood and land 
The majority of refugees who fled Bhutan were farmers, and the loss of their home and land caused by 
exile was something exceptionally tangible for them. With livelihoods destroyed, noted one refugee, ‘we 
started collecting food by begging from all Nepalese people who were living there and the local area. 
Then more and more people started arriving in Nepal from Bhutan and the crowd got bigger and bigger 
every day.’ 
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While asking for handouts produced by the loss of livelihoods presented a challenge to dignity, even more 
so was the loss of an exceptionally strong connection to the land. Numerous writings about Nepali-
Bhutanese refugees note the nostalgia with which they refer to the orange groves and cardamom trees that 
they used to own (Chatterjee, 1993). Lacking this connection created a profound sense of loss of Ghar 
Bari, of belonging, for this land-tied population (Khatiwoda and Haight, 2015).  
 
In addition, the land that Nepali-Bhutanese tilled before they left Bhutan represented not only their 
external assets but their store of knowledge. One refugee described wistfully how he had taught his (non-
Nepali) compatriots how to ‘tame the water’ and how to till the soil effectively. ‘We taught them how to 
grow rice, how to get rice out of it and how to till the land. We taught them everything we knew in the 
Bhutanese agriculture sector. But the reality is that we were kicked out of the country and organizations 
who are supporting us are begging for our life, begging for our day to day lives for our food and rice. Is 
this fair?’   
 
Thus in this early stage of refugehood, when Nepali-Bhutanese refugees lacked both autonomy and 
normalcy, dignity was a challenge. 
 
Living in the camps: Establishing normalcy 
As the emergency phase of camp life morphed into routine, a modicum of normalcy returned that brought 
with it dignity. For example, refugees began working for camp organisations or informally outside the 
camps, which offered a measure of autonomy. While these jobs paid significantly less than had they been 
Nepal citizens, refugees noted with pride that they were contributing to Nepal’s economy and having 
some control over their lives. One refugee, echoing Oka’s assertion about the importance of agentive 
consumption, noted that ‘when I have employment I can have money and when I have money I have 
access to different facilities and then I have less problems in life.’ 
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Refugees were also able to use the normalcy of sending their children to camp schools to restore dignity. 
One refugee noted that ‘despite all of our persecutions that happened back in Bhutan, because of all the 
facilities we have in the camp in Nepal, we have… managed to have some better experiences than we had 
back in Bhutan. It is seen that many of our generation has been able to acquire a good degree of education 
and this is a matter of happiness for all of us.’ This quote reflects a community pride about education as a 
good for the entire refugee population, and indicates that during the time that camp schools ran regularly, 
dignity was maintained. 
 
Through organizations established by camp members, many important initiatives facilitated moments of 
normalcy and dignity. One example is a program of ‘story time’ in which the elderly told stories of their 
past lives in Bhutan to youth who were born in the refugee camps and had never stepped foot in Bhutan. 
These are the stories of orange groves and cardamom trees, of Hindu rituals and Ghar Bari. From these 
stories, the elderly shared their memories and escaped from reality momentarily. ‘Children meet with the 
elderly to learn about Bhutan… to have the feeling that yes I belong to Bhutan.’ This restoration of the 
past, the reminder of what the elderly had and how they contributed to Bhutanese society, was widely 
seen as a way to sustain the dignity of this honoured population in the camps.  
 
During the Resettlement phase: dignity diminished 
Since 2008, when tens of thousands of refugees began leaving for permanent homes in countries of the 
Global North, refugees who remain in Nepal have had both their autonomy and normalcy, and thus their 
dignity, compromised. Some of the factors that were a point of pride in the past two decades have 
deteriorated in the advent of resettlement. Education for schoolchildren, for example, has witnessed its 
best teachers resettling and a significant reduction in morale for those teachers who remain (Banki, 
2008a). A lack of motivation by students is also a problem in the camps today. Students are reluctant to 
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attend class because their friends have already resettled or resettlement processes conflict with school 
times. One refugee teacher noted that ‘What they think is all the others are resettling to the other countries 
so why should we stay back and study here? So all they do is they wait for the day when they can actually 
resettle in the other countries.’ 
 
A decline in motivation and morale, tied to dignity, has been noted by many. Refugees who used to take 
pride in their work at the Camp Management Committee (CMC) are ‘not motivated to work because their 
facilities have already been cut’ and turnover among CMC staff is quite high. Routine activities like 
repairing one’s hut has become more difficult because housing materials have been cut as well, making it 
difficult for remaining refugees to be autonomous.  
 
Further, the ability to trade goods received through humanitarian agencies – a common practice that Oka 
links to agentive consumption and dignity – is increasingly difficult because rations have been cut. ‘The 
proportion of the green vegetables … and even uniforms for small children has been cut off.’ While there 
is now increased cash in the camps because resettled refugees have sent back remittances to remaining 
family members, this has not necessarily translated into improved dignity for remaining refugees. 
Additional spending money, it was noted by some of the refugees, has been spent on drugs and alcohol, 
and hazardous drinking among the refugees has been noted elsewhere (Luitel, Jordans, Murphy, Roberts, 
and McCambridge, 2013).  
 
Perhaps the most difficult element of remaining refugees’ lives is that the normalcy of having their friends 
and families nearby has been destroyed. Social structures that were stable for two decades frayed in a 
matter of months. One refugee noted that ‘Since resettlement has started lots of things have been 
changing inside the camps. It has separated our families apart. While our wives are outside, the husbands 
are here, the parents are somewhere else, and their sons’ children are there. Everyone is separated. So that 
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is causing depression among the refugees and that has led to suicide, crime, and other tragic incidents 
inside the camp.’ 
 
Within the separation of families, the most spoken about issue was the separation of the elderly and 
younger generations, because the latter tend to remain behind. One elderly refugee said ‘Our religion say 
that it is our morality and our ethics to look after our parents and the problem is because of the 
resettlement process our children and grandchildren have not been able to look after us. …We elderly 
people are left behind in the camps alone, we do not have our children or grandchildren along with us.’ 
 
This separation from family and friends as a toll on dignity is not to be underestimated. Remaining 
refugees have adopted a narrative – borne from a lack of autonomy and normalcy – of being victims. ‘We 
could have done a lot of things which we are not able to do now and we are the victims of the 
separation…all are separated now, someone’s wife is not here, someone’s husband is not here, someone’s 
daughter is not here, someone’s son is not here. And it is all because of resettlement. Who will be looking 
after them?’ 
 
MOVING FORWARD: RESTORING DIGNITY 
For remaining Nepali-Bhutanese in the camps in Nepal, dignity remains a challenge. But as we argued 
earlier, external factors can improve the chances to restore dignity since it is dynamic. Just as autonomy 
and normalcy were taken away, so they can be restored.  
 
First, refugees can secure their dignity in Nepal by being given the opportunity to be contributing honest 
members of society. One noted with pride ‘We the refugees… have to stay under the standards of 
international conventions and law. And we understand that we have to make sure we don’t break the law 
of the country where we are living now.’ Work options in Nepal that would give refugees the legal right 
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to work would ensure self-reliance and allow refugees to be law abiding, both of which increase the 
potential for having dignity present. 
 
Second, education for remaining children would help offer dignified solutions for the problem of low 
morale and boredom of refugee school children. Since Nepali-Bhutanese are both ethnically and 
linguistically similar to Nepalis, permitting the refugees to study in Nepali local schools could advance 
dignity not only for their children but for the entire community  
 
Third, encouraging systems that allow dispersed families to maintain social ties with their families and 
friends could bring normalcy to the everyday lives of those left behind. A fine example of this system is 
Bhutan News Service, an online news outlet jointly published by diaspora Nepali-Bhutanese and those 
who remain in the camps. While internet is not available widely in the camps, access is possible nearby. 
Other initiatives that link dispersed Nepali-Bhutanese together have the potential to inject a sense of 
belonging to all Nepali-Bhutanese, wherever they are physically located.  
 
Finally, for Nepali-Bhutanese who hold on to the hope of returning to Bhutan, who have longed for their 
orange groves for more than two decades, the yearning for some to return to their homeland should not be 
ignored by the international community. Efforts to encourage the Government of Bhutan to permit some 
refugees to return to Bhutan – even if a small number – should be sustained.   
 
CONCLUSION 
The resettlement of refugee populations is often considered a linear good: those who move from countries 
neighboring conflict to a resettlement country of the Global North are assumed to have a higher likelihood 
to achieve autonomy and normalcy, and following that, dignity.  
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But by focusing on the lesser-studied experience of those refugees who remain in camps, this article has 
shown that threats to dignity are also a concern for refugees left behind after mass resettlement has 
occurred, as the potential for education, agentive consumption and social ties deteriorates. While this 
unintended consequence of the international community trying to improve the lives of refugees is 
important to note, we can take some hope from the fact that dignity’s dynamism allows for the hope of its 
restoration. 
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